Android system attackers have proposed various attack schemes to invade users' privacy. One way is to use ADB (Android Debug Bridge) with advanced permissions but low protection. In order to set up an ADB connection successfully, the USB debugging option of the target device must be turned on. However, the existing ADB-based attack schemes have not proposed how to enable the USB debugging, so it couldn't be considered that their attack chain is completable. This paper presents an approach for attacking Android devices by exploiting JavaScript to enable USB debugging automatically in the device's system settings, which fills in the gaps of existing solutions. This method can bypass the security mechanism of USB debugging mode and obtain an ADB connection without the user's authorization. It can also bypass the alerts that ADB Action Monitor displays when sensitive behaviors are detected. Based on AccessibilityService, Auto.js and Scrcpy, an application called Salaxy is designed and implemented to demonstrate the effectiveness of this method. Besides, Salaxy can monitor and manipulate Android devices remotely.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet technology, various new application technologies and patterns are emerging that people's lives more convenient, such as the introduction of edge computing [1] , [2] , substantial improvements on the efficiency of network services; the development of wireless sensors [3] and the improvement of sensor network management schemes [4] - [6] , making the Internet of Things (IoT) more practical and driving the development of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and its security solutions [7] . The decentralized mode brought by blockchain technology has provided novel security thinking for network data [8] , and the emergence of mobile smart devices has subverted the status of traditional computers on the Internet and has also brought about tremendous changes to human lifestyles.
Today, mobile smart devices are rapidly gaining popularity. The Android OS (operating system) developed by Google is one of the major OSs for mobile devices. Its open-source and extensible features make it attractive and competitive, but at the same time, they easily attract the attention of attackers.
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In fact, the privacy of Android users has been challenged by various malware and attacks, such as Soundcomber [9] , which extracts a small amount of sensitive information from the audio sensor; TouchLogger [10] , which exploits the side channel to infer keystrokes; SimBad [11] , which is hidden in the Google Play Store for users to download and install. To avoid malicious activities, Google has taken some security measures, such as developing anti-malware software, such as Malwarebytes [12] , detecting malicious applications in the Google Play Store more rigorously, and using sandboxes to restrict software access to the system; each of these measures have limited malware attacks to some extent.
However, attackers are constantly exploring new solutions to challenge Android security design. ADB is a multipurpose command-line tool that allows the developer to communicate with the connected Android device through a USB cable. ADB provides many functionalities, including file transfer, shell access, application installation and debugging, and port forwarding. ADB very effectively allows application developers to obtain maximum privileges on Android smart devices, which draws the attention of attackers. The first malware to exploit ADB resource exhaustion was DroidDream [13] , which sends malware to Android devices by installing a rootkit on the device. Hwang et al. [14] presented some feasible, stealthy attacks that can be performed with ADB. Windows malware [15] attempted to infect Android devices to steal private data used ADB as its main tool. Amarante et al. [16] have already identified three attack scenarios based on the use of ADB and developed proof-of-concept scripts that can extract private data from a USB-connected device connected to a computer. Weizhi Meng et al. designed a new type of charging attack, called a juice filming attacks [17] , based on a standard USB connector and an HDMI port, which is able to steal users' private data through automatically video-capturing their inputs without drawing the attention of users. Reference [18] proposed a scheme for obtaining the system application logs using ADB to perform hijacking attacks. It could be seen that many attacks against the Android system exploit the vulnerabilities of the ADB tool-if no proper protection of ADB has been enforced when using a USB connection, it may compromise the privacy of smart device users. Consequently, Google has strengthened the protection of ADB, and USB debugging mode is disabled by default and has to be explicitly enabled in the developer options menu. To prevent unauthorized access via the ADB protocol, secure USB debugging was introduced in Android version 4.2.2. [19] . A requirement was added that each ADB session has to be authenticated. This security mechanism ensures that USB debugging and other ADB commands cannot be executed unless the user can unlock the device and acknowledge the dialog.
The three attack scenarios proposed by Amarante et al. [16] clearly noted that the attack will succeed only if USB debugging is enabled. Turning on USB debugging is quite complex. First, developer mode must be opened, as the developer options screen is hidden by default. To make it visible, go to Settings > System > About phone, tap Build number seven times [20] and enter the lock screen password. Return to the previous screen to find Developer options at the bottom. Next, tap Developer options, and then tap USB debugging. When the Android device is connected to an unknown host, the system will display a dialog window asking whether to accept an RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) key that allows debugging through this computer and needs to be confirmed. How to convince users to perform these operations is a problem that cannot be ignored. In fact, a way to enable secure USB debugging is not given in the above solutions and other ADB-based attacks. Therefore, this mechanism seems to be very effective in preventing ADB-based attacks.
This paper presents an approach to enable USB debugging automatically in Android devices based on AccessibilityService. This method can bypass the security mechanism of USB debugging mode and bypass the improved security mechanism design of USB debugging mode, which was proposed in [21] . An attack model, called Salaxy, is implemented. Salaxy is based on the C/S (client/server) architecture, combining Auto.js and Scrcpy (i.e., the two usual open-source software programs).
The Salaxy sever is controlled by the attacker, and the client is installed on the victim's Android phone. Salaxy can execute preset scripts to enable USB debugging, connect to the server, and then monitor and manipulate the victim's Android smartphone. The method is simple, easy and does not need to avoid the phone's anti-virus software and is suitable for the Android versions 5.0 or higher.
We propose an attack method for Android devices that effectively monitor and manipulate Android phones.
We design and implement Salaxy, a proof-of-concept application, to demonstrate this approach.
Salaxy combines harmless software(Auto.js and Scrcpy) to perform a malicious task. It is simple and easy to implement and will not alert anti-virus software.
We add an induced interface to Auto.js. The induced interface is just a simple UI (User Interface) to communicate with the Salaxy Server and does not require sensitive permissions. We modify the socket of Auto.js so that it automatically connects to Salaxy Server each time it starts.
We develop two kinds of automated JavaScript scripts to turn on the USB debugging mode(customized and generic) that are stored on the server-side and do not require the user to download. The scripts will not attract the attention of the user when they run.
We test the Salaxy on Huawei Honor 10, OnePlus6 and Xiaomi 6X phones, proving that Salaxy can video-capture and manipulate the target phone whose version is Android 5.0 or higher.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ACCESSIBILITYSERVICE [23] Accessibility services provide UI enhancements to assist users with disabilities in using Android devices and apps. They run in the background and receive callbacks by the system when AccessibilityEvents are fired. Development of an accessibility service requires extending the Accessibil-ityService class and implementing its abstract methods-onAccessibilityEvent() and onInterrupt(). These two methods will always run in the background once the service is started. When the UI changes, an AccessibilityEvent is generated which contains the type of object being acted upon, the descriptive text, etc. An accessibility service gets information about a UI event through the onAccessibilityEvent() callback method. Then, the onAccessibilityEvent() is executed to implement the function customized by a developer.
Google's motivation in developing Accessibility services was to assist users with disabilities, such as visual impairments, color vision impairments, hearing loss, and mobility issues. However, its powerful features also provide convenience for attackers. This paper takes advantage of the functions of Accessibility services to turn on USB debugging mode automatically. This inspiration comes from the work of Tian et al. [22] , they navigated to the settings menu using touchscreen automation and allow USB debugging from their attacking machine
B. AUTO.JS [24]
Auto.js is an open-source JavaScript automation program running on the Android platform that does not require root access. The functionality of Auto.js is based on Accessibil-ityService. It provides functions such as data monitoring, image monitoring, widget operating and automated workflow (through running a script), which is similar to UIAutomator, Google's UI testing framework, but doesn't require a complicated environment configuration like UIAutomator. You just need to install Auto.js on your Android device to use it. In addition, by binding your computer's IP (Internet Protocol) address to Auto.js (one of the features that Auto.js provides), you can operate your computer to make Android devices execute remote scripts. We developed Salaxy based on Auto.js, augmented an induced interface, and changed the value of the IP address variable to a fixed one (the attacker's IP address) at the code level. In other words, you could bind Auto.js to any IP address you want but in Salaxy, it will automatically be bound to the attacker's IP address.
C. SCRCPY [25] Scrcpy is an ADB-based command-line tool that displays and controls Android (version 5.0 and higher) devices connected through a USB cable or over TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). It works without any root access but requires USB debugging on in the system settings. Scrcpy is for GNU/Linux, Windows and Mac OS. Once the Android device is connected to a computer with Scrcpy installed by a USB cable, the Android device screen can be viewed on the computer and the screen status changes can be synchronously received. The computer mouse, keyboard and other control devices can also be used to operate the Android device.
In our attack process, after opening USB debugging mode through running a remote script, we will launch Scrcpy to manipulate Android phones. The final effect is shown in Figure 1 . 
D. THREAT MODEL
Throughout the paper, we assume an extra public USB charging station controlled by an attacker, tries to attack the connected Android device through a USB cable. We assume that Salaxy is disguised as a software that provides some kinds of functionality (such as a charging manager used with the charging station), and the victim downloads and installs Salaxy for their own needs. We assume that the target phone provides the Allow ADB debugging in charge only mode option in the system settings (which could find in Huawei phones and it is easy for us to turn it on via running a remote script). If not, we assume that when Salaxy prompts the user to select ''MTP'' mode when charging, the user will do so.
The threat model is appropriate because any malware tricks victims into installing and activating itself by providing users with features they want or displaying some discount ads. The threat model is based on the users' obey consciousness. When users need the features of the software, they often follow the software's prompts to operate the mobile phone. 
III. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
By combining AccessibilityService's ability to monitor the UI events of Android phones and act on behalf of users, Auto.js's ability to run scripts automatically and Scrcpy's ability to capture phone screens in real time, Salaxy can turn on USB debugging mode and then monitor and manipulate the victim's device without being detected by anti-virus software. Salaxy consists of multiple components as shown in Figure 3 . What we have to be aware of is that the Auto.js client has been bound to the Auto.js debugging terminal controlled by an attacker. Our attack procedure using Salaxy is divided into five steps: 1) When the user clicks on Salaxy Client, first he will see the induced interface which prompts him to enter the lock screen password, and then he does it. So the Salaxy Server could receive the password from the client. 2) After entering the password, the Auto.js client interface is displayed. The user turns on the AccessibilityService according to the prompt of Auto.js. 3) The attacker uses auto.js debugging terminal to remotely execute scripts stored on the attack side.
4)
When scripts finish running, the USB debugging of the Android phone will be turned on. 5) The attacker runs Scrcpy on the attacker side to manipulate the victim's phone.
It should be noted that we don't require the USB cable connected before step 5. In fact, the first four steps could be completed in the wireless connection. Salaxy Server starts the service listener and waits for the client to connect. The MainActivity class of Salaxy Client implements the Runnable interface, which defines the IP address of Salaxy Server and port. When the user starts the Salaxy Client, it will instantiate a Socket (Salaxy Server's IP address, port) and request to connect to the Salaxy Server, then the client and server communicate through a socket. At the same time, the Induced interface is shown.
A. INDUCED INTERFACE
For most Android smartphones, enabling developer mode requires a password if the lock screen password is set. Currently, most smartphone users have set a lock screen password. Only a small number of disabled or elderly people have not. Therefore, obtaining the lock screen password of a victim's smartphone is a very important part of the attack process. The appearance of the induced interface comes from the phone's lock screen interface. It is the first interface shown when running Salaxy, which prompts a user to enter his lock screen password. This link is a deceptive method, not a technical one because the interface is just used to obtain the password entered by the user instead of performing the password verification. This design is based on many observations. As people become more reliant on smartphones, mobile users frequently unlock their phone screens every day, so they are often not too sensitive to software behaviors that require a lock screen password.
The interface provides a 4-digit password option and a gesture one. There are four input boxes set in the 4-digit password interface. When the user enters four numbers, they will be sent to the Salaxy Server. The pattern interface provides a nine-square (3 * 3) grid. The implementation of this interface is mainly divided into the following parts:1) Icon. Define a point class to display the icon, which is the dot in the ninesquare grid. It stores some attributes, such as the position of the top, bottom, left, and right of the current point, the state of the point, and its index. 2) Draw the pattern area. Define a GesturePsdView class to draw the nine-square grid, and add nine point-type objects to represent the nine icons. In this class, the color of the selected point and the color of the line are defined. 3) Draw the gesture path. Override the onTouchEvent() method, which listens to TouchEvent events such as ACTION_DOWN, ACTION_MOVE, and ACTION_UP events to record the path when the user connects different points by drawing. 4) Obtain the pattern. Salaxy determines the position of the point that the user's finger touches, records the index of each point with the ''index'' attribute, and then saves the index of the touched point in sequence according to the point that the user's gesture passes (from top to bottom, the order of the points is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) . The entire recorded process does not allow point repetition. Finally, a sequence of user connection points is obtained and sent to the server. Salaxy Client writes data to the socket through a DataOutputStream class, the Salaxy Server receives the stream through DataInputStream, and then uses the read-UTF() method to read the data. As a result, the Salaxy Server receives the plaintext password entered by the user.
B. SCRIPT LOGIC DESIGN
For security reasons, developer mode on the Android system is disabled by default, and it cannot be opened by means such as executing system commands in the background. Navigate to the settings menu using the touchscreen and click it is the only way to enable it. To prevent users from accidentally turning on developer mode, Android hides this option from the system settings menu. Take the Huawei Honor series smartphones as an example. The way to turn on USB debugging mode is to go to Settings > System > About phone, select Build number seven times, enter the lock screen password, return to the previous screen, and tap Developer options > USB debugging. A dialog window appears with ''Allow USB debugging?'': click OK. Apparently, turning on USB debugging mode is a tedious process that requires human intervention. Therefore, USB debugging mode is difficult to exploit in traditional attack scenarios.
The method presented in this paper is based on Accessi-bilityService and Auto.js. We wrote simple scripts that convert the above operations into automation. We investigated the methods of turning on USB debugging mode for different brands Android smartphones, such as Huawei, OnePlus, Xiaomi, Vivo, Meizu, and Coolpad, and found that they are similar. One of the differences between these devices is the password verification for opening developer mode. In the above brands, Xiaomi and Meizu smartphones do not require a password when turning on developer mode, which makes the attack easier. The other difference is the locations of smartphone options, such as the System option of a Huawei smartphone, which is located at the bottom of the Settings menu (we need to scroll down to find it). However, it is at the top of the Xiaomi smartphone so that we can omit the scrolling operation. This paper takes a Huawei smartphone as an example to illustrate the implementation of turning on developer mode, as Huawei smartphones have the most complicated steps, requiring screen scrolling and password verification. The complete operation of allowing USB debugging for Huawei mobile phone is Settings -System -About Phone -click ''Build Number'' 7 times -System -Developer Option -USB debugging -OK. The script behavior is shown in Figure 4 . Under the condition that USB debugging is allowed, when the user connects his mobile phone to the USB cable, the Android system will detect whether the currently connected host is in the whitelist for ADB of the mobile phone, if not, a dialog box will be displayed to ask whether to accept the RSA key that allows debugging through this host, and OK must be selected. The Salaxy script will continuously monitor the OK widget. Once the dialog that requires user confirmation appears, it will be confirmed by the script immediately so that the user has no time to check and stop it. The script behavior is shown in Figure 5 . The UI of the mobile phone changes according to the execution of a script, which will easily attract the attention of the user. To make the changes of the phone's UI hidden from the user, we will open an opaque floating window when the script starts and close it after the USB debugging is successfully turned on. Figure 4 illustrates when the floating window is opened and closed.
C. SCRIPTWRITING
Auto.js provides two methods to click on an option in the smartphone menu: widget-based and coordinate-based operations.
1) WIDGET-BASED OPERATIONS
A widget-based operation refers to selecting a widget on the screen and getting its attributes or manipulating it. Generally, widget-based operations have good compatibility with different smartphone models. The general software interfaces are composed of many widgets; for example, the image part is a picture widget (ImageView), and the text part is a text widget (TextView). A widget has various attributes, including text (text), description (desc), class name (className), and id. We usually use some attributes of the widget to search for it, show in List1. Unable to click;
List 1 Searching for the Settings Widget
Some widgets have a clickable attribute of false, which means that they cannot be tapped through the click() function. Thus, we should call the bounds() function to obtain their coordinates and then click on the coordinates. For example, if we need to click on the System and About phone widgets, we cannot call click() directly but rather bounds(). The pseudocode is shown in List 3.
List 3 Obtain the Coordinates of the System Widget and Click on It
// Obtain the coordinates of the System widget and click on it targetWidget=Find(''System widget''); coordinates = targetWidget.bounds(); x-axis = coordinates.right; y-axis = coordinates.centerY(); click(x-axis,y-axis);
If the widget we are looking for does not exist in the current view, we need a swipe operation to scroll down the phone screen, which is achieved by scrolling down the list widget named ''android.support.v7.widget.RecyclerView''. The list widget itself provides a scrollForward() method for users to call. For example: In practice, we encounter some special cases. some widgets not only have a clickable attribute of false but also do not provide the above-mentioned bounds() function to obtain the coordinates, or some elements of the UI cannot be clicked because they are not a widget. for this reason, the widget-based approach is not always efficient, and a coordinate-based approach is needed.
Android smartphones take the point in the upper-left corner of the screen as the coordinate origin. The screen size of each mobile phone is different, resulting in different coordinate data for the same position, so the universality of the coordinate-based method is worse than that of the widget-based method. However, the advantage of the coordinate-based method is that we do not need to consider the clickable attribute of the widget. The script can perform the click operation with given only the coordinates. In this experiment, the numeric keypad of the OnePlus6 smartphone is not a widget. We need to click Next in the lower-right corner of the keyboard when the password is entered. The solution is shown in List 6.
List 6
Click on the Location Where the Coordinates Are (900, 1760) // Click on the location where the coordinates (900, 1760) are Set the parameter of the phone screen size to (1080, 1920); Call the method to click (900, 1760);
Affected by The resolution of the phone screen, the accuracy of the coordinate-based method is slightly lower than that of the widget-based method. However, sometimes The Widgets May Not be clickable. The widget-based and coordinate-based methods Have Their Own Strengths. Our solution uses the combination of the two methods to complete the script.
The implementation of the floating window is very simple. auto.Js provides floaty.rawwindow() function to set floating windows. We only need to define an opaque floating window object, setting its size to fill the screen. We could even set some text on the floating window as needed. for example: 
IV. EVALUATION A. SCRIPT EXECUTION SUCCESS RATE
We take developer mode as an example. The number of widgets needed to open developer mode is recorded as the path length. The actions that need to be performed during this process are as follows: find the widget (Find), click the widget (Click), scroll the screen (Scroll) and input the password (Write), which are known as F, C, S, W for short. According to the path length and the action sequence, three most representative Android smartphones are selected as the experimental objects: Huawei Honor 10, OnePlus6 and Xiaomi 6X. Their developer mode startup path is as follows: Huawei Honor 10: go to Settings > System > About phone, tap Build number seven times, and enter the lock screen password. (path length: 5)
OnePlus6: go to Settings > About phone, tap Build number seven times, enter the lock screen password, and tap Next. (path length: 5)
Xiaomi 6X: go to Settings > My device > All parameters, and tap Build number seven times. (path length: 4)
The operation model abstracted from the paths above is shown in Table 1 . Obviously, of all the types of mobile phones that have been investigated, Huawei Honor 10 requires the most operations, while Xiaomi 6X requires the least. Moreover, it has been observed in the experiment that the screen-scrolling operation takes the most time, and the range of scrolling has to be considered, which makes the success rate unsatisfactory. In other words, the screen-scrolling operation can be considered to have the highest complexity. Considering that turning on developer mode on the Xiaomi 6X does not require a lock screen password, the success rate of the attacks on this system should be the highest among the three.
We customized scripts to turn on developer mode automatically for each experimental object and conducted 400 experiments on each experimental object. After 100 experiments, we found that the success rate distribution of the three mobile phones basically stabilized. The results are shown in Figure 6 .
However, in actual attacks, the brand of the victim's smartphone is often uncertain. We observe the similarities and differences among the paths of the three experimental objects and then set up some branch paths in the script. Finally, a generic script was generated to turn on three experimental subjects' developer modes simultaneously. The disadvantage of the generic script is that it needs to search for more widgets, which will reduce the success rate. However, to ensure compatibility, the generic script must tolerate a drop in the success rate. We ran the generic script on three experimental subjects at the same time and repeated the experiment 400 times. The results are shown in Figure 6 . The main reason for the low success rate of the generic script on OnePlus6 is that the path inconsistency causes the phone to perform additional operations. After developer mode is enabled, we will similarly perform the script to enable USB debugging mode and then run Scrcpy on the Salaxy Server to monitor and manipulate the victim's Android smartphone.
Many times the reason for the failure is that some target widgets are located at the top of the interface of the phone (such as About phone widget of Huawei and My device widget of Xiaomi), so the script may accidentally tap the wrong widget when the notification bar activates from the top.
B. TIME PERFORMANCE OF THE SCRIPTS
To verify the advantages of the scripting operations, we tested the time required for manual operation and script execution about turning on developer mode. We asked 200 testers to manually open the developer mode for Android phones and then used the scripts to do the same for 200 times. In fact, after 100 attempts, we found that the time consumption of the three mobile phones basically stabilized. The results are shown in Figure 7 (we selected 100 experimental data for plotting). It could be seen that running scripts can save two-thirds of the time compared to manual operations on the three experimental objects. The script for Xiaomi 6X has the best performance.
The Huawei and OnePlus smartphones take approximately the same amount of time in manual operation because they have the same path length. Xiaomi takes the least amount of time because no password verification is required. From the test results of the script executions, the Xiaomi smartphone, which has the shortest path length and the least script actions, takes the least amount of time. The average amount of time consumed by the Huawei and OnePlus phones are almost the same, but the stability of Huawei script is better.
Ultimately, we can conclude that the method of running a script to turn on developer mode will greatly reduce the time consumption. The shorter the path and the fewer the operations, the more efficient the script is.
V. DISCUSSION

A. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
When applying the attack theory method into practice, the real scene needs to be considered. We need to investigate the characteristics of a target victim and modify the UI or functions of Salaxy according to those characteristics.
1) USING SALAXY AT A PUBLIC CHARGING STATION
We propose the use of Salaxy at a public USB charging station, which is inspired by a juice filming attacks [17] ; this method can automatically video-capture user inputs during charging, and the attackers can easily manually recover users' private data, such as personal identification numbers (PINs) and email accounts, based on the recorded video. In our approach, Salaxy is camouflaged as an app for use with charging stations. Before charging the device at a charging station, users must install and register Salaxy. Less vigilant users will do so and connect the phone with a USB cable of the charging station. Then, we have a high probability of turning on USB debugging mode in the victim's Android device and being able to set up a video transmission between the Salaxy server and the victim's device. Compared with juice filming attacks, Salaxy is able to bypass the security mechanism of USB debugging mode and monitor the screen of the victim's devices without any hardware, such as the VGA/USB interface. Furthermore, Salaxy can manipulate the device remotely, but juice filming attacks cannot. Last but not least, Salaxy can still maintain the connection via a TCP/IP connection after the user unplugs the USB cable from the charging station.
2) DEPLOYED IN SMART CAMPUS INFRASTRUCTURES
Smart campuses use technology and infrastructure to support and improve campus services, teaching, learning, and research [26] , which will greatly promote the reform and innovation of the education model. Smart campuses provide campus network services, learning and research facilities to teachers and students and maintain and manage many underlying devices and their data [27] . For Salaxy, smart campuses are a good place to hide probably.
3) SMART NETWORK TVS
IPTVs (Internet Protocol Televisions) [28] are a combination of Internet and TV technology. They have been used on a large scale and are moving toward intelligence. Due to the portability of the Android system, most of the smart TVs on the market today are Android-based. Smart IPTVs must rely on the network and a charging cable, which provides the possibility of a Salaxy attack.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF SALAXY 1) '' CHARGE ONLY '' EFFECTIVENESS
One of the Salaxy's drawbacks is that when the user selects ''charge only'' when charging, the fifth step of the attack method(shown in Figure 3 ) will be ineffective, because Scrcpy, one of the components of Salaxy, requires ''MTP'' mode to monitor the phone. In the Threat Model(Section II-D), we assume that the target phone provides the Allow ADB debugging in charge only mode option in the system settings, but in fact, many brands of Android phones do not provide this option, so we still require the ''MTP'' mode selected by the user. So whether the attack is successful depends on the user's vigilance against the security of the ''MTP'' mode.
2) PROBABILITY OF CORRECT PASSWORD
The other weakness is whether we can receive the correct lock screen password depends on the user's input in the induced interface. If the user just randomly enters a string of numbers, we won't be able to open the developer mode of his phone which will prevent subsequent attacks. Overall, getting the correct password is a probability event.
3) EQUIRES HUMAN INTERVENTION
Besides, the integration of Auto.js and Scrcpy needs further improvement. The two separate functional modules must be connected through an ADB command. Executing this ADB command requires manual operation, but we hope to fully automate the attack process, which will be a challenge in the future.
VI. RELATED WORK
Amarante et al. [16] identified three different scenarios and present three methods based on the use of the Android Debug Bridge tool to furtively extract private data from Android mobile phones in those cases. In the first scenario, the mobile phone whose Android version is 2.2 is rooted and its USB debugging is on. In the second, the mobile phone with Android 4.0.4 is unrooted but its USB debugging is still on. In the third, the version is 5.0 with unrooted and the USB debugging is off. However, it was not possible to extract data from the device in the third case. By contrast, Salaxy requires neither root privileges nor an opened USB debugging.
Tian et al. [29] surveyed and categorized USB host-related attacks. On their basis, Opasiak et al. [30] considered a broader spectrum of the USB-related attacks and evaluated the security of the Secure USB debugging from the USB connectivity perspective. With the Secure USB debugging mechanism, when the Android mobile device is connected to a given host for the first time, it requires a host authentication. There is no data integrity mechanism in any other step of the ADB communication. They presented an approach to compromise Android-based devices by exploiting the ADB protocol using Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks. They connected the victim's phone to the attacker's computer. When the phone sends A_AUTH TOKEN, the attacker's computer forwards the message to the trusted host and captures a valid signature for this challenge. This signature will be sent back to the attacker's host and then to the victim's phone. Finally, the phone will authenticate the attacker's computer as a trusted host and grant access to all device resources. However, this attack requires activation of USB debugging on the mobile phone and requires physical access to the host that the victim previously trusted. That is, they did not propose a way to turn on the USB debugging option automatically.
Tian et al. [22] proposed a solution to bypass the Android security mechanisms through AT commands. They found that AT commands accessed through the USB interface allow almost arbitrarily powerful functionality without any authentication required. They retrieved 2,018 Android binary smartphone firmware images and extracted 3,500 AT commands. In the LG G4 mobile phone firmware image, the AT command to bypass the lock screen (AT%KEYLOCK=0) and the one to enable USB debugging (AT%USB=adb) were found. Once the attacker has bypassed the lock screen by the KEY-LOCK AT command, he could send touch events can to navigate the phone which connected to the attacker's computer through a USB cable to open the developer mode (the command can also bypass the password authentication of developer mode), then send the USB debugging AT command. To the authors' best knowledge there is no better method to bypass the lock screen with minimal permissions and a high success rate. However, not every version of the Android device provides the above two AT commands.
Juice filming attacks, a charging attack designed by Meng et al. [17] , can steal users' information by automatically taking videos, when they are interacting with the phones during the charging process, without causing user awareness. They use a VGA2USB interface which is connected to a computer forming a malicious charger, and the computer then can automatically video-capture user inputs when the phone is connected to the charger. By contrast, Salaxy uses an easier model to construct the attack process, not only to record information as the Juice filming attack does, but also to simulate users' operation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an approach to attack Android-based devices by running JavaScript scripts to turn on USB debugging mode. This method can bypass the security mechanism of USB debugging mode and obtain ADB connection authorization without the user's authorization. It can also bypass the alerts that ADB Action Monitor displays when sensitive behaviors are detected. With this method, we designed and implemented a proof of concept application called Salaxy, which is composed of Auto.js and Scrcpy. Then, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Salaxy on three different brands and models of Android smartphones. The results show that Salaxy can remotely monitor and control Android devices in real time, allowing the attacker to manipulate the phone.
Today, people rely heavily on smartphones, which carry much work information and personal private data and have a very high correlation with personal property. The security risks of USB debugging undoubtedly threaten the security of smartphone users. Some measures have to be taken to enhance the security of USB debugging mode. In addition, other Android-based electronic devices, such as smart TVs (discussed in Section V-A), also need to strengthen the security of USB debugging mode.
